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Executive summary
• The depiction of the euro area/European Union (EU) as a ‘fourfold union’ (financial un-
ion, fiscal union, economic union, political union) emerged in the first half of 2012 at the 
height of the euro-area crisis. It was primarily shaped by the recognition of the bank-sover-
eign vicious circle and the need to break it to ensure the survival of Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU). 
• This framing of EMU and EU integration is inevitably simplistic but its four-part cate-
gorisation remains relevant and useful when assessing current and future challenges to 
European integration. 
• In the past half-decade, Europe’s financial union has been significantly strengthened but 
remains incomplete and is challenged by the expected exit of the United Kingdom (Brexit). 
No consensus has been found on fiscal union, and the existing fiscal framework based on 
administrative control is problematic. Economic union has not made material progress. 
Political union, a more intangible notion, might have advanced further than many observ-
ers realise, even as national politics remain paramount for the vast majority of EU citizens. 
• A near-term agenda to strengthen EMU, for which decisions could be made in the 
course of 2018 and without any treaty change, should rest on a balance of further risk-shar-
ing and enhanced market discipline, building on the significant risk reduction achieved 
over the last half-decade. At the heart of this next step of integration would be regulatory 
curbs on banks’ sovereign exposures in the euro area and a European deposit insurance 
scheme. Complementary initiatives should include, on the fiscal side, a reform of the 
accounting and auditing framework that applies to euro-area member states, and on the 
(structural) economic side, a new architecture of sector-specific EU authorities to enforce 
the single market in regulated industries. 
• A more ambitious vision would have to include the European pooling of selected tax 
revenue streams to support an incipient fiscal union. The corresponding policy debate, 
however, might be best delayed until after the next European Parliament elections in June 
2019.
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The emergence of the fourfold-union vision 
in 2012
The transformation of the EU economic and financial policy framework in the wake of the 
last decade of crisis has been enormously complex, and it is easy to get lost in the details. The 
euro area’s endeavour of monetary and economic union of politically sovereign countries is 
historically unprecedented. Its initial design was incomplete. Its early development can be 
viewed as something of a collective discovery process; no expert fully anticipated the way the 
vulnerabilities of Economic and Monetary Union would play out under duress. The descrip-
tion of the related challenges through the analytical lens of the fourfold union crystallised in 
the first half of 2012 at a time of acute stress, and remains relevant.
The key insight gained during the most disruptive phase of the euro-area crisis, particu-
larly after its escalation in the summer of 2011, was the realisation that the direct and indirect 
financial linkages between national governments and national banking systems, also known 
as the bank-sovereign vicious circle, or colloquially the ‘doom loop’, had become the central 
vulnerability in a context of general uncertainty about the future of the euro area. 
This realisation was gradual. In the first few years of the financial crisis that started in 
mid-2007, there was near-universal denial in euro-area countries of the largely home-grown 
nature of the problems encountered. Specifically, national banking supervisors had per-
verse incentives to neglect the build-up of risk in domestic banks, as they tended to promote 
and defend these same banks as ‘national champions’ on the increasingly open European 
competitive playing field. The appearance of sovereign credit risk in the euro area was not 
immediately connected in the European public policy debate with banking sector fragility, 
partly because the country in which that risk manifested itself first and most strongly, Greece, 
was an outlier in terms of its domestic banks not appearing to have taken excessive risks of 
their own. 
From an analytical standpoint, the bank-sovereign vicious circle appears to have been 
first identified in 2008-09 by International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff economists (Mody, 
2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Their insights were based on close observation of developments 
in Ireland, a textbook case of contagion from the domestic banking sector to the national 
sovereign, in the wake of the Irish government’s provision of highly generous guarantees over 
the domestic banks’ liabilities in October 2008. In the period that immediately followed, the 
IMF was partly distracted from this stream of analysis by the intensity of the Greek crisis, but 
other analysts and scholars made similar observations. With the raising of systemic concerns 
in Spain, Italy and France during the course of 2011, the bank-sovereign vicious circle became 
an increasingly evident and widespread framework for analysing the crisis. By early 2012, it 
had become a mainstream reference included in public policy pronouncements1. 
The European Union’s inability to stem the contagion through the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle in turn exposed its lack of effective executive decision-making capacity. This EU ‘execu-
tive deficit’ itself formed a vicious circle with its more familiar democratic deficit: not only did 
the EU institutions’ lack of authority prevent them from solving the crisis, but their incapacity 
to do so also fed the European public’s distrust of them (Véron, 2012). The crisis thus came to 
be seen as a test of the political commitment of individual member states and their citizens to 
the overall European integration project. 
Things came to a head in June 2012. The short-term catalyst for this moment of reckoning 
was the rapid deterioration of market perceptions of the Spanish banking sector following the 
forced nationalisation of Bankia, a large and troubled bank, in May. Simultaneously, the out-
come of the Greek parliamentary election on 17 June, following a turbulent national political 
sequence, sent a strong signal that Greek voters did not favour an exit of their country from 
1 See Véron (2016a) for references. 
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the euro area, which in turn created space for all member states to proclaim their willingness 
to hang together. 
The ‘Four Presidents’ Report’ of 26 June 2012, brought these strands together and crys-
tallised the vision of a fourfold union (Van Rompuy, 2012a). It was prepared by the President 
of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, in close cooperation with his peers at the 
European Commission (José Manuel Barroso), the Eurogroup (Jean-Claude Juncker) and the 
European Central Bank (Mario Draghi), thus its name. It proposed “a vision for a stable and 
prosperous EMU based on four essential building blocks: An integrated financial framework 
[…] An integrated budgetary framework […] An integrated economic policy framework2 […] 
Ensuring the necessary democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision-making within the 
EMU”. Echoing contemporary references in the public debate, these four items were imme-
diately referred to as banking (or financial) union, fiscal union, economic union and political 
union, a summary Mr Van Rompuy did not discourage3. 
Three days later, on 29 June, the euro-area heads of state and government announced 
their decision to create a banking union, with the words “we affirm that it is imperative to 
break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” (Euro Area Summit Statement, 2012). 
Starting with a fiscal union would have been an alternative way to address the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle, and had been widely advocated the previous year not least in Germany4. But 
ultimately this came to be seen as impractical in the context of Europe’s existing economic 
and political structures. By contrast, the commitment to a banking union could be enshrined 
in firm, game-changing decisions without entailing immediate and explicit financial risk-
sharing, let alone treaty change. Accordingly, the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) with its hub at the European Central Bank (ECB) was the centrepiece of the 29 
June announcement. 
In the immediate aftermath of this breakthrough, policymakers acted as if they had done 
enough to stabilise the situation. The pledge to allow the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) to participate in direct bank recapitalisations after the SSM’s ‘effective’ establishment, 
also included in the leaders’ statement of 29 June 2012, was later rowed back on and eventu-
ally voided by imposing conditions that are so onerous that the instrument may never be used 
(ESM, 2014). Meanwhile, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), proposed by 
the European Commission earlier in June 2012, was tightened during the legislative process. 
This allowed political leaders to proclaim that the past practice of national bank rescues using 
taxpayers’ money could be replaced in the future by pure market discipline involving the 
financial participation (or ‘bail-in’) of failing banks’ creditors and other claimants, with-
out having to create a meaningful safety net at the European level. Meanwhile, the Spanish 
situation was addressed by an assistance programme that was finalised on 20 July 2012, and 
involved the ESM lending to the Spanish government so it could recapitalise Spanish banks to 
the extent needed. 
Even though it was only partially implemented, the fourfold-union vision had become a 
powerful reference to frame subsequent debates about EMU reform, and remains relevant to 
this day. It is inevitably simplistic and imprecise: each of the four ‘unions’ can mean different 
things to different people. Nevertheless, the respective and separate areas of financial services 
policy, fiscal policy, structural economic policies and political institutions together cover 
most of the ground on which further reform can make EMU more resilient. Because they are 
partly interdependent, progress in one area can feed progress in others. The fourfold frame-
work is thus useful both to assess progress made since the seminal episode of mid-2012, and 
2 In the Four Presidents’ report, this item was not defined as precisely as the other three, but the indications were 
that it would refer mostly to structural economic policies. 
3 A follow-up report in the same format six months later (Van Rompuy, 2012b) referred to the evolution of EMU 
“towards banking, fiscal and economic union”. See also Véron (2012). 
4 See eg Zeit Online, ‘Merkel will Fiskalunion ohne Volksabstimmung’, 2 December 2011, available at http://www.
zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-12/euro-merkel-volksabstimmung. 
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to outline future steps that might be needed to ensure EMU sustainability. 
In terms of geographical scope, none of the four categories is strictly restricted to euro-
area countries. Financial services regulation is mostly provided under the EU internal market 
policy framework and thus applies to the entire European Economic Area (EEA). Many 
aspects of the fiscal and structural economic policy coordination framework, including 
the European Semester for review of national policies, apply to all EU member states, even 
though others are euro-area only. The most powerful EU instrument for structural economic 
reform, at least for countries not undergoing an assistance programme, is the bloc’s long-
standing internal (or single) market policy, which is EEA-wide by definition. And the union’s 
existing political and judicial institutions are all at the EU level, not the euro area. Tensions 
between euro-area-specific concerns and the existing construct of the European Union are 
thus inherent and pervasive in the vision of the fourfold union. 
A half-decade of developments: 2012-17
In this section, the fourfold analytical framework of financial, fiscal, economic and political 
federalism in Europe is applied to provide a highly summarised description and holistic 
assessment of developments in the last five years. 
Financial sector
Based on the landmark decision of 29 June 2012, the SSM was rapidly established and on 4 
November 2014 assumed its supervisory authority over all euro-area banks (directly over the 
larger ones and indirectly over the smaller ones). The SSM is now a widely respected super-
visor, to the extent that Stockholm-based Nordea referred to the SSM’s credibility when an-
nouncing in September 2017 its decision to move its headquarters to Helsinki in the banking 
union area5. In addition, the euro area’s leaders in December 2012 decided to complement 
the SSM with a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) centred on a new agency, the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB), with a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at its disposal. The SRB became 
fully operational in January 2016 and rather successfully passed its first real-life test with the 
resolution action it took in early June 2017 in relation to Banco Popular Español. 
More broadly, the last five years have seen the euro-area banking sector shift from a state 
of acute fragility in mid-2012 to a significantly healthier, though not fully recovered, condi-
tion as of September 2017. With often painful action in the meantime in countries including 
Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, the risks have 
been shifted from the country level to the bank level. In other words, a number of banks will 
probably require further restructuring that in some case might lead to their resolution or 
liquidation, as was the case with Banco Popular. However, none of these is likely to lead to an 
immediate revival of the bank-sovereign vicious circle in a manner that could threaten the 
corresponding country’s sovereign debt market access. Though many details are debatable 
and there are plausible arguments that the clean-up of the sector could have been achieved 
more quickly and at lower public cost, there is also little doubt that this process of reinstating 
trust in the banking system was facilitated by the early implementation of banking union and 
especially the build-up of supervisory capabilities at the SSM. 
The banking union, however, remains a work in progress and can in no way be described 
as having achieved the stated “imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sover-
5 See for example Simon Johnson and Johan Ahlander ‘Banking group Nordea snubs Sweden with HQ move to Fin-
land’, Reuters, 6 September 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-nordea/banking-group-
nordea-snubs-sweden-with-hq-move-to-finland-idUSKCN1BH28R. 
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eigns”. The most direct financial linkages, from banks to sovereigns through national deposit 
insurance schemes and from sovereigns to banks through the high home bias observed in 
most banks’ sovereign exposures, have remained broadly unchanged since 2012. Less direct 
links are also pervasive and unchanged since 2012, including lingering implicit or explicit 
national guarantees of bank liabilities other than insured deposits6, the concentrated geo-
graphical footprint of many medium-sized and large European banks that exposes them over-
whelmingly to a recession in a single country and, as is the case for many banks, governance 
and ownership structures that create high dependencies on national politics and policy. 
The initial successes of the banking union project have also emboldened the European 
Commission to promote a more ambitious integration agenda for the entire financial sector, 
dubbed Capital Markets Union by Jean-Claude Juncker who announced it in his maiden 
policy speech as president-elect of the European Commission in July 2014. While the concrete 
policy achievements of this initiative have been underwhelming so far, it has nevertheless 
reframed the public debate about capital markets and possibly paved the way towards an 
expanded role for the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to become the 
direct supervisor of an increasing number of market segments and enforcer of an increasing 
number of capital market rules in the near future, even though ESMA is currently under-re-
sourced and its governance was not designed for such a role. 
Fiscal framework
The ESM, which was formally created in the course of 2012, has now established its credibili-
ty as an emergency lender to countries and is increasingly able to manage assistance pro-
grammes, including policy conditionality, on its own – even though no such programme has 
been granted so far without any IMF involvement. In the course of the past half-decade, the 
ESM and its creditor partners were able to bring an end to the programmes in Ireland, Portu-
gal, Spain and Cyprus. The ESM will, however, remain involved in Greece for the foreseeable 
future. 
At the legislative level, the EU fiscal framework has remained fairly stable since 2012, 
following the numerous changes introduced in the previous two years (chronologically the 
so-called ‘six pack’, ‘two pack’ and Fiscal Compact). The corresponding process of adminis-
trative review and assessment by the European Commission has arguably fostered greater 
discipline and facilitated comparisons between countries, but has ultimately been exposed 
as unenforceable or at least unenforced, since the European Commission has refrained from 
using its ability to apply financial sanctions in cases of non-compliance. 
Meanwhile, uncertainties linger over the integrity of the production of government 
accounts and statistics at the national level, despite reforms introduced since the egregious 
malpractice revealed in Greece in 2009 (and earlier in 2004) led to very significant restate-
ments of key ratios such as government deficit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Eurostat 
has been granted greater powers to double-check numbers in case of doubt, but ultimately 
cannot ensure the integrity of national accounting and statistical processes. A particularly 
troubling case has been the multiple prosecutions of Andreas Georgiou, head of the Greek 
statistical office from 2010 to 2015, in a highly charged political climate and despite repeated 
warnings from EU officials7.
6 The European Commission’s current interpretation of its state aid control mandate, last set out in a Communica-
tion of July 2013, practically prohibits such guarantees on equity and subordinated debt, but not on senior debt or 
uninsured deposits. The liquidation of Banca Popolare di Veneto and Veneto Banca in late June 2017, in which all 
senior creditors were fully reimbursed, illustrated the lingering willingness of at least some member states to use 
this flexibility even at a high cost in terms of taxpayers’ money. 
7 See eg Jim Brunsden, Arthur Beesley and Kerin Hope, ‘Eurozone officials warn on Greece statistics trial “farce”,’ 
Financial Times, 3 August 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/3d213384-77b1-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691. 
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Structural economic policies
Even more than on fiscal behaviour, the European Union has struggled to establish new 
mechanisms that would lead to better and more consistent structural reforms in individual 
member states, leaving aside those under an assistance programme. The Euro Plus Pact of 
2011, which sought non-binding mechanisms under the so-called open method of coordi-
nation, did not achieve tangible results. The idea of complementing the review of structural 
reforms embedded in the European Semester with ‘contractual arrangements’, in which 
member states would commit to specific reform projects against European financial support, 
appears unlikely to be ever implemented following lengthy and essentially fruitless discus-
sions since its early formulation (eg Van Rompuy, 2012b). 
Meanwhile, the European Union’s most powerful structural economic policy instru-
ment remains its single market framework, complemented by assertive competition policy 
enforcement by the European Commission and its national counterparts. In this area too, 
the European Union needs to adapt to a changing environment. Two trends in particular 
are challenging and have been met so far by only partial responses at best. The first is the 
emergence of major global players in digital services that represent an increasingly significant 
component of the social fabric, namely a handful of large digital and social media platforms 
which enjoy dominant positions in their respective markets and are typically not as highly 
regulated in their home jurisdiction, the United States, as they might be in Europe. Among 
other things, this generates a risk of single market fragmentation as different member states 
or even local governments adopt sharply divergent approaches to these companies’ services, 
often under the guise of important and legitimate concerns such as individual privacy but 
sometimes also motivated by special interests, as has been the case variously with Airbnb and 
Uber among others. A second challenge is that an increasing share of inward foreign invest-
ment into the European Union comes from countries with political and security approaches 
that are significantly different from those of the European Union: primarily China but also 
others such as Russia or the Gulf countries. Whereas it would be a mistake to close Europe to 
such investment or to create an inherently unpredictable investment environment, there are 
also legitimate security concerns. The existing policy framework does not accommodate these 
in a manner that is consistent with the freedoms embedded in the internal market (see Röller 
and Véron, 2008). 
Political cohesion
Of the four areas of the fourfold-union vision, this is the least technical, the least precisely 
defined and also certainly the most important. The conventional wisdom is that EU political 
cohesion was impaired during the crisis by poor policy decision-making at the EU level, the 
lack of alignment of interests between different countries and the rise of populist anti-EU 
parties in an increasing number of countries. The June 2016 UK referendum vote for Brexit 
unquestionably supported this narrative, as have recent developments in which the rule of 
law as defined in EU treaties has been questioned in Hungary and Poland. 
A bleak narrative of EU political disintegration, however, fails to account for other observa-
tions. The most obvious is that despite many prophecies of its imminent demise, the euro area 
has kept its integrity. Whether the euro area could survive the exit of any of its member states 
remains a matter of debate, but the fact is that none has exited so far even in dire circum-
stances such as those of Cyprus in March 2013 or Greece in early July 2015. While this expe-
rience should not lead to complacency about the euro area’s sustainability, it suggests that, 
in spite of all the vocal disagreements and cultural differences, the political forces holding it 
together are very strong. 
The euro area’s survival capacity is not the only indication of deep, and possibly increas-
ing, EU political togetherness in recent years. The fairly united front presented by 27 EU 
member states in the Brexit negotiation is another example. So is the fact that following 
the 2014 EU parliamentary election, and against many observers’ anticipations, EU leaders 
followed an interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty that committed them to accept the ‘lead 
The EU single market 
framework needs to 
adapt to a changing 
environment, 
particularly in the 
face of the emergence 
of major global 
players in digital 
services and the 
increasing share 
of inward foreign 
investment from 
countries with 
significantly different 
political and security 
approaches
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candidate’ of the political grouping that collected the most votes – in this case the European 
People’s Party’s Jean-Claude Juncker – as president-elect of the European Commission. At a 
more symbolic level, the twelve-starred European flag has acquired unprecedented visibility 
in the public life of several member states, for example in the national election campaigns 
in Austria and France in 2016 and 2017 (and, somewhat ironically, also in the UK in pro-
tests against Brexit after the referendum). More poignantly, the ‘Euromaidan’ revolution 
in Ukraine in early 2014 saw the European flag featuring prominently in a major national 
upheaval, illustrating the continuing political attractiveness of the European Union in its 
immediate neighbourhood8. 
On a more institutional level, the EU order has also been resilient against multiple chal-
lenges. The ECB has withstood successive lawsuits, mostly originating in Germany, that have 
questioned the scope of its policies. In this process, the German Constitutional Court has 
acknowledged the authority of the European Court of Justice in an unprecedented manner9. 
The European Commission’s enforcement of state aid control in the banking sector has been 
made more authoritative by the 2013 Banking Communication. The SSM and SRM, even 
though their geographical scope of authority is currently limited to the euro area10, constitute 
unprecedented cases of sector-specific supranational oversight in areas that were long seen as 
unquestionably falling under national sovereignty11. 
Thus, and in spite of the Brexit vote setback, the European Union is assuming an increas-
ing number of features of a political entity, even as sovereignty still resides at the national 
level under the existing EU legal order and in the predominant perception of the European 
public. 
Possible next steps: an agenda to 
strengthen the fourfold union
As the previous section’s stylised analysis illustrates, the fourfold union is a work in progress. 
It is not realistic to imagine it being fully completed in the foreseeable future. As with any 
federal construct, the European integration process inherently produces hybrid systems in 
which different levels of governance are entangled. With this in mind, the current state of the 
fourfold union is still unsatisfactory when measured against the stated goal at the start of the 
process five years ago, namely the “imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns”. Reaching that goal should be the guiding objective of European leaders in their 
next steps of decision-making. 
The 2018 opportunity
In several ways, the coming 12-18 months represent an exceptional opportunity for European 
reform. Brexit is a complex negotiation but no longer a systemic risk for the EU27 countries 
8 Whereas there have been examples of political use of the European flag in other neighbourhood countries includ-
ing Belarus, Georgia and Serbia, since the early 2000s, the Euromaidan was arguably the most iconic such case. 
9 See eg Euractiv, ‘Top German court refers ECB bond-buying case to EU judges’, 11 February 2014, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/top-german-court-refers-ecb-bond-buying-case-to-eu-judg-
es/. 
10 Non-euro member states of the European Union may voluntary join the banking union through a process known 
as close cooperation. None has so far done so, but Denmark and Sweden indicated in July 2017 that they might 
consider such a decision in 2019. 
11 ESMA also has direct EEA-wide supervisory authority, but only over limited market segments, namely credit rating 
agencies and trade repositories. (Note: as mentioned in the disclaimer, the author is an independent board mem-
ber of a trade repository supervised by ESMA). 
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that will remain in the union if and when the UK leaves. The two largest countries of the EU27, 
France and Germany, will enter this period with fresh government mandates following the 
2017 election cycle12. For them and several other member states, the next significant political 
deadline is the European Parliament elections of 2019, which may focus public debates on the 
EU policy agenda. 
This political context coincides with the end of the decade-long phase of widespread 
banking system fragility, as suggested in the previous section. This implies both that dis-
cussions about policy options need no longer be dominated by legacy issues, and that the 
euro area’s present economic recovery is likely to remain robust for some time. Meanwhile, 
memories of the crisis are still vivid and may be enough to stop complacency from leading to 
inaction. A less than benign geopolitical environment might also incentivise the European 
Union to put its house in order. 
Specifically, the view that the banking union would be initially a ‘timber-framed’ construc-
tion and that it would take more time to build a more solid ‘steel-framed’ version was memo-
rably propounded by Germany’s finance minister in a May 2013 article (Schäuble, 2013). The 
argument was that the arrangements for the banking union should initially be pragmatic and 
somewhat ad hoc, and that a later phase would make it possible to achieve “our long-term 
goal: a truly European and supranational banking union, with strong, central authorities”. 
Now that the legacy of the crisis is being convincingly addressed, with a number of remaining 
situations to handle but no systemic concerns, this vision can be used as a guide for the next 
phase of reform. 
Of course, awkward political developments are still possible, and even probable, in the 
12-18 months ahead. Several member states, of which Italy is the largest, will hold national 
elections, the outcomes of which are hard to predict. The tensions over the Catalan independ-
ence movement in Spain appear set to escalate, as do those about EU rule-of-law breaches in 
Hungary and Poland. Compared to the last ten years of intensive fire-fighting, however, these 
risks are comparably limited in scope. 
The core bargain: from timber-framed to steel-framed banking union
As noted above, breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle is the core purpose of the banking 
union project, but has not yet been achieved through the establishment of the SSM and SRM. 
The most direct bank-sovereign linkages are through national deposit insurance schemes and 
the high home bias in banks’ sovereign exposures. The next phase of reform should address 
both of these issues simultaneously. 
This would be aligned with the rhetorical emphasis promoted by the German govern-
ment13 of matching risk-sharing with risk-reduction, or perhaps more specifically, greater 
market discipline14. Regulatory curbs on banks’ sovereign exposures would mitigate the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle in crisis situations, making it plausible that banks could survive 
a sovereign debt restructuring in their home country15. But the curbs would also result in sig-
nificantly enhanced market discipline for the sovereign issuers themselves, since there would 
no longer be a presumption that domestic banks would act as buyers of last (or next-to-last) 
resort of their debt. In turn, the weakening of that link can be expected to reduce govern-
ments’ incentives to insist on guarantees of the banks’ uninsured liabilities. As a risk-sharing 
12 Since France’s election cycle is five years, and Germany’s is four, this only happens once every twenty years. 
13 See eg Francesco Guarascio ‘Germany blocks small progress on banking union at EU summit’, Reuters, 16 Decem-
ber 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-banks-regulations/germany-blocks-small-progress-on-
banking-union-at-eu-summit-idUSKBN1442Z8. 
14 The distinction is more semantic and rhetorical than substantial. An emphasis on market discipline signals a more 
explicitly forward-looking approach than risk reduction, since risk reduction has already been achieved with the 
now well advanced (though belated) handling of legacy issues in the euro-area banking system. 
15 A highly stylised proposal for such curbs is in Véron (2016b). The author is working on a more detailed blueprint, 
forthcoming in October or November 2017. 
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complement to the sovereign exposure curbs legislation, the transfer from the national to the 
European level of the explicit insurance of covered deposits would eliminate the most direct 
channel of bank-to-sovereign contagion. 
As for the latter, the European Commission in November 2015 published a well-designed 
legislative proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), with a decade-long 
transition towards a fully European framework divided into two phases of re-insurance and 
co-insurance respectively. But no comparably detailed proposal has been made so far on 
sovereign exposure curbs. This gap should be addressed as soon as possible for an appropri-
ate debate in preparation for a balanced policy package to be endorsed at the political level 
during 201816. 
Sovereign exposure curbs and EDIS would form the core of the bargain, but additional 
initiatives are desirable. On the market-discipline side, several steps should be taken:
• The European Commission should tighten its state aid control framework by going further 
in the direction of senior debt bail-in than in the currently applicable Banking Communi-
cation of 2013;
• The SRB should be made responsible not only for decisions on resolution schemes, as is 
already the case, but also for their execution, which is currently left to national authorities;
• All banks in the banking union should be required to use International Financial Stand-
ards (IFRS) to achieve better accounting transparency and comparability;
• An effort should be made to harmonise bank insolvency law, with the long-term aim of an 
eventual single bank insolvency regime for the entire banking union area17.
On the risk-sharing side, the ESM should be explicitly mandated to provide a backstop to 
both the SRF and the joint Deposit Insurance Fund that would be created as part of EDIS. The 
Direct Recapitalisation Guideline (ESM, 2014) should also be amended to allow the ESM to 
participate in precautionary recapitalisations (as defined in Article 32 of the BRRD), which 
would mitigate that specific bank-sovereign linkage and also instil better financial discipline 
into such recapitalisation processes. 
Importantly, none of these measures requires a treaty change. They would be adopted as 
EU internal market legislation (ie with qualified-majority voting in the Council), or through 
decisions of the European Commission and the ESM respectively for the changes to the Bank-
ing Communication and to the Direct Recapitalisation Guideline. In this respect, the build-up 
of a steel-framed banking union would actually be easier than was envisaged by Mr Schäuble 
(2013), in which he took the view that treaty change would be needed to eventually deliver on 
his long-term vision. 
Complementary reforms under the fourfold vision
Because the bank-sovereign vicious circle was the greatest fragility of EMU revealed during 
the ten years of crisis, addressing it as suggested above should take priority in the EMU reform 
agenda. But as the assessment in the previous section suggests, it is far from the only area 
where reform is evidently needed. 
For the financial union, a necessary next step would be the reform of the governance 
and funding of ESMA to transform it into an independent, authoritative and well-resourced 
supervisor. This would then pave the way for an expansion of its supervisory authority to mar-
kets segments and matters of conduct of business, which are currently in the remit of national 
16 This proposed approach differs from the one signalled by the European Commission in a recent Reflection Paper 
in which the recommendation is to decide on EDIS first, and on sovereign exposures at a later stage (European 
Commission, 2017).
17 A legislative proposal to harmonize some aspects of the hierarchy of claims on failing banks, published by the Eu-
ropean Commission in November 2016 and currently under consideration by the EU co-legislators, can be viewed 
as an initial step towards that aim.
No detailed proposal 
has been made so 
far on sovereign 
exposure curbs. 
This gap should be 
addressed as soon as 
possible
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authorities. Such a reform would in turn powerfully contribute to integration and conver-
gence in the capital markets area and thus to the European Commission’s goal of a capital 
markets union as a necessary complement to banking union (see eg Constâncio, 2017). 
For the fiscal union, the introduction of sovereign exposure curbs would, as mentioned 
above, significantly strengthen market discipline for sovereign issuers and thus create 
powerful incentives for fiscal discipline. Also in order to improve market discipline, a proper 
accounting and auditing framework should be introduced for sovereigns in the euro area, 
ie the standards under which government and national accounts are prepared should be 
further harmonised, and most importantly, the European institutions should be more directly 
involved in their review and possibly also their preparation. The size of the ESM should also 
be increased so that it can more credibly face crisis scenarios involving the larger euro-area 
countries. As a counterpart to the increased market discipline, a reform of the existing frame-
work based on EU-level administrative disciplines could be envisaged in order to reduce 
the gap between its stated purpose and its limited enforceability, which was revealed by the 
recent episodes. 
For the economic union, the early success of the SSM and SRM should be used as a proof 
of concept for the development of European agencies with direct supervisory and enforce-
ment authority in other sectors in which the national implementation of even harmonised 
rules contributes to cross-border market fragmentation. This is the case in a significant 
number of regulated services sectors, including electricity and gas transport and distribu-
tion, rail transport and, increasingly crucially, digital services in matters of privacy and data 
protection. For decades, the received wisdom in the European Union, including for financial 
services, was that supranational supervision and enforcement was desirable but politically 
impossible. Now that the banking union has demonstrated that it can work in practice as well 
as in theory, this insight could form the basis for a significant push forwards for the EU single 
market. Simultaneously, an EU-level legislative framework for the security review of foreign 
direct investment should be introduced, even if in the immediate future the actual assess-
ments continue to be predominantly made at the national level18. 
As for politics and institutions, public accountability of EU agencies and the scrutiny of 
the European Parliament should be enhanced. For example, in a reform of the governance 
of ESMA, a more compact board of, say, five to seven members should be created to replace 
the current unwieldy and intergovernmental Supervisory Board, and its members should 
be vetted by the European Parliament, as is the case for the SRB’s full-time board members 
and for the chair and vice chair of the SSM Supervisory Board. On a different level and to 
strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of EU institutions, France and the other member 
states should renounce the European Parliament seat in Strasbourg and accept Brussels as 
the single venue for that institution, thus putting an end to the monthly migration that unnec-
essarily exposes the EU democratic process to the charge of wastefulness. 
Most significant in the near term for ‘political union’, however, will be the 2019 European 
Parliament elections, as this will be the first time that the vote will be explicitly and (presum-
ably) unquestionably framed by the ‘lead candidate’ system introduced under the Lisbon 
Treaty, and thus a vote for the quasi-executive function of European Commission president. 
How much cross-border political mobilisation results from this new system will be important, 
not only for the perception and role of the European Parliament and Commission, but also 
more generally for the evolving debate about the democratic drivers of EU policymaking. 
More ambition for fiscal union? 
The point on the 2019 European Parliament elections hints at why the above recommenda-
tions might appear somewhat unambitious in the area of fiscal union, compared with widely 
publicised recent suggestions of European safe bonds, a euro-area fiscal capacity or budget, a 
18 An argument and blueprint for such a framework was proposed in Röller and Véron (2008) and remains relevant. 
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European Monetary Fund and/or a euro-area finance minister. The underlying analysis is that 
the euro area and European Union are politically prepared for the suggested steps combining 
risk sharing and market discipline, and thus for the shift from the present ‘timber-framed’ to a 
‘steel-framed’ banking union, but that the same might not be true when it comes to the ability 
to tax and spend, or fiscal sovereignty. 
This assessment might underestimate the readiness of the European body politic for a 
major step towards fiscal integration. Even so, it appears prudent to reserve the political 
window of opportunity of 2018 for projects that have a reasonably high likelihood of practical 
feasibility. If the 2019 European Parliament election results signal a limited, or perhaps even 
declining, commitment of the European public to EU integration, such prudence will have 
been vindicated. If, on the other hand, the election outcome suggests a greater appetite than 
is now generally perceived for joint steps towards greater togetherness, then it will be time to 
consider bolder reforms of the fiscal framework.
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